



United nations conference
on climate change

COP21/CMP11



Implications of the Paris Outcome for Viet Nam

DHMCC & CCWG, Thursday 21 January 2016

Koos Neefjes

Overview

1. The build-up to Paris
2. The Paris Outcome: selected highlights
3. The politics of Paris
4. Important consequences for Viet Nam
5. What's next for & in Viet Nam?

1. The build up to Paris (the 21st COP)

- ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDCs: emissions mitigation, adaptation) (Lima’s success: submitted by 184 countries before COP21, but is towards ≈ 3 °C above pre-industrial levels)
- A sense of now or never, after all these years, with Copenhagen (COP15, 2009) lingering in the background
- El niño effects that added urgency, as freak weather was felt everywhere, even though this is actually not (just) climate change
- Early high level gathering: pressure in the cooker.

Nations Unies

Conférence sur les Changements Climatiques 2015

COP21/CMP11

Paris France



2. The Paris Outcome: selected highlights

- Preamble: support the rights and social-economic development of all
- Keep global warming to 'well below' 2 °C and 'pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels'. Good for Viet Nam because it would limit climate change impacts
- 'Differentiation' preserved, but ...
- Qualitative adaptation goal & Warsaw Int. Mech. on Loss & Damage
- Scaled-up finance (not just GCF), also from developing countries (VN!)
- (I)NDCs by all; progressive (stock take 2018; 5-year cycle from 2023)
- 'Transparency' agreed: monitoring & reporting (burden ↑)

3. The politics of Paris

- Petroleum, gas and coal interests are always ‘in the room’
- Domestic politics in some countries dominated many discussions
- Also critical: USA-China agreement in 2015; EU28 divided but united
- Economic growth is the main interest of BASIC: increase emissions before they decrease. But BASIC also have technological and economic interest in Renewable Energy, and are amongst the biggest investors
- The (social, economic, political) costs of climate change effects and of adaptation are central to the discourse of e.g. SIDS and LDCs, ≈ EU, leading to “coalition of ambition”, with surprising members added later
- Relatively high degree of unity in G77&China (chair: South Africa); but disagreed on who is more vulnerable than ‘particularly vulnerable’ (\$€¥)
- French diplomacy; South African ‘indabas’; Peru’s smiles; Brazil’s proposals



Arnaud Bouissou - MEDDE / SG COP21



Arnaud Bouissou - MEDDE / SG COP21



MEDDE / SG COP21



- MEDDE / SG COP21

4. Important consequences for Viet Nam

- Viet Nam's INDC assumed the world would be aiming for 2 degrees, not "well below" 2 degrees of warming. Now NDCs "represent a progression over time". Developing countries will also set "economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets". So there is new pressure to reduce emissions (focus: fossil fuels, forestry). If 1.5 degrees:
 - World/Viet Nam: emissions peaking in 2030/35? Zero net-emissions 2055/60?
 - Technological and economic revolution is needed. Drivers?
 - Research additional ways to reduce emissions further with limited costs
- No progress on financing REDD+ results based payments: VN's response?
- A mechanism "to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development" was established. Rules, modalities must be developed, and must "fit" Viet Nam.

4. *bis*

- A global adaptation goal (Art.7); agreement on the approach to adaptation; recognition of developing countries' efforts and needs; inclusion of the Cancun Adaptation Framework are very positive for Viet Nam.
- Art.7.9 on adaptation planning and implementation fits Viet Nam's actions and (national, provincial, and sectoral) plans, and Viet Nam can develop regional plans (eg. Mekong & Red river deltas)
- Reporting on adaptation (Art7.10-14) is useful for learning and planning. Communication on adaptation plans and actions are voluntary and will be partially supported (finance, technical assistance) (Art.7.13)
- Inclusion of Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss & Damage (Art.8) is major success, as VN is climate-disaster prone. Decision on establishing "a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves as a repository for information on insurance and risk transfer": what will Viet Nam do?

4. *ter*

- Climate finance will increase after 2020, but the agreements on financing accommodate the prevailing trend:
 - Limited finance, with a focus on LDCs and SIDS
 - Finance “from a variety of sources”, so not only public
 - Private finance (leveraging) will be increasingly important
 - Partly through GCF, GEF, AF; mostly other channels
 - Fiscal policies will be key to investment in e.g. energy and also forest
 - Regulation will be key to investment in adaptation
- Viet Nam will receive finance for mitigation and adaptation, but it must increasingly rely on its own resources. Raising finance domestically through e.g. a carbon tax would encourage mitigation. Saving up for major adaptation investments later is wise (Mekong?)



5. What's next for & in Viet Nam?

1. Communicate, debate Paris implementation in Viet Nam with many stakeholders
2. Formulate action plan on Paris Agreement implementation (by Oct 2016)
3. Communicate 'ratification, accession or approval' to the UNFCCC
4. Reassess, and possibly update the INDC, and communicate to UNFCCC
5. Participate in stock-takes (2018, 2023, 2028, ...)
6. Absorb NDC in national strategies, action plans (period: 2021 onwards)
7. Formulate / update mitigation plans and projects (focus: energy, forestry)
8. Formulate / update adaptation plans (national? regional, also sectoral) and projects
9. Implement mitigation and adaptation plans before and after 2020
10. Engage with development of rules of mechanisms, etc., under the UNFCCC
11. Reinforce national institutions and capacities re climate change
12. Strengthen monitoring systems, including GHG emissions
13. Report on achievements (e.g. Third National Communication; BUR2; ...)

Thank You!